Peranan Pengawasan Pelabur Institusi dan Kekaburan Perolehan
(The Monitoring Role of Institutional Investors and Earning Opacity)
Azlina Ahmad,
Norman Mohd Saleh,
Takiah Mohd Iskandar & Mohamad Adnan Alias
ABSTRAK
Pelabur institusi merupakan kumpulan pelabur canggih yang berpotensi mengawasi pengurusan firma serta
menyumbang kepada pengurangan kos agensi. Kajian ini meneliti peranan pengawasan pelabur institusi dalam
ekonomi yang melibatkan pelaburan dana awam serta campur tangan kerajaan yang tinggi. Kajian menfokus kepada
kesan pemilikan pelabur institusi terhadap amalan pengurusan perolehan firma portfolio berasaskan tahap kekaburan
perolehan. Selain itu, kajian turut melihat sama ada status awam/bukan awam pelabur institusi mempengaruhi
keupayaan mereka melaksanakan pengawasan yang berkesan. Pemilikan pelabur institusi diukur berdasarkan tiga
dimensi iaitu: (1) peratus pegangan ekuiti pelabur institusi; (2) konsentrasi pegangan pelabur institusi; dan (3)
bilangan pelabur institusi. Kecenderungan mengurus perolehan ditentukan berdasarkan tahap kekaburan perolehan
firma yang merupakan skor agregat empat ukuran iaitu: (1) keagresifan perolehan; (2) perlicinan perolehan; (3)
pengelakan melapor kerugian; dan (4) pengelakan melapor penurunan dalam perolehan. Sampel kajian terdiri
daripada syarikat tersenarai di Papan Utama dan Papan Kedua Bursa Malaysia dari tahun 1996 hingga 2005. Data
dikutip daripada pengkalan data Datastream dan laporan tahunan syarikat. Perhubungan antara tahap kekaburan
perolehan dengan pemilikan pelabur institusi diuji berdasarkan analisis regrasi berganda dengan mengawal kesan
tahap pegangan ekuiti pengurusan firma, saiz firma, tahap keumpilan firma dan kualiti juruaudit firma. Keputusan
kajian menunjukan bahawa pelabur institusi bukan awam dengan konsentrasi pegangan yang tinggi melaksanakan
pengawasan yang lebih berkesan terhadap pihak pengurusan firma berbanding pelabur institusi awam.
ABSTRACT
Institutional investors are regarded as sophisticated investors who have the potential to monitor managers and help
reduce firm's agency cost. This study examines the monitoring role of institutional investors in an environment of high
public funds presence and high government intervention. It focuses on the effects of institutional ownership on portfolio
firms' earnings management by examining the association between institutional ownership and earnings opacity. This
study also provides evidence on the effect of public/non-public status of institutional investors on their monitoring
effectiveness. Institutional presence is proxied by three measures: (1) percentage of institutional equity shareholdings;
(2) concentration of institutional shareholdings; and (3) number of institutional investors. Propensity to manage
earnings is measured by four attributes of earnings numbers that could lead to earnings opacity: (1) earnings
aggressiveness; (2) earnings smoothness; (3) loss avoidance; and (4) earnings decreases avoidance, aggregated into
firm level scores of earnings opacity. Data were obtained from Datastream and annual reports of samples firms listed on
the Main Board and Second Board of Bursa Malaysia from 1996 to 2005. Association between institutional ownership
and earnings opacity is tested via multiple regression analysis controlling for management shareholdings, firm size,
firm's leverage level and audit quality. Results show that non-public institutional investors with concentrated
shareholdings provide more effective monitoring in comparison to public institutional investors.
